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lNTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the main features of the Spanish 
fiscal and expenditure policies over the past fifteen years and briefly 
addresses both the adjustment efforts over the 1975-1985 period and 
the responses of public policy to the 'EEC cum 1992' shock. 
The impressionistic analysis which follows can be succintly 
surrrmrized by three basic questions. Which are the main structural 
charac; teristics of the Spanish public sector on the eve of the EEC 
membership? How did public policy respond to the impact of the EEC 
accession? What policies could be implemented as to reduce the costs 
associated to the fundamental economic changes envisaged for 1992? 
The first question is addressed in Section I. Section Ir will address 
the issue of public policy responses to the permanent shock of 1986 
as well as to the challenges posed by the 1992 European Internal 
Market. 
l. THE PUBLlC SECTOR ON THE EVE OF EEC ACCESSION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The last fifteen years have been characterized by an 
ex traordinarily rapid 9rowth in the degree of government· s in vol vement 
in the Spanish economy. Against a historical background' of substantial 
off-budget public sector, intervention, which had given rise to a 
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rich variety of rigidities and distortions, the general government 
expendi ture inítiated a steeply upward trend in the mid-seventies. 
As a resul t, while general government expendíture rose 1 percentage 
point of GOP per annum in the EEC in the 1975-1985 period, in Spain 
the public expenditure share almost doubled to reach a peak of 42.5 
per cent, this corresponding to an average annual rise of some 1.8 
per cent of GOP. 
Two broad factors in this outstripping change of trend 
can be singled out. First, the decline in economic performance relative 
to levels experienced and anticipated in the previous decade led 
to a marked increase in transfers, subsidies and income maintenance 
expendi tures. Second, the polítical change that ended at a democratic 
regime started a sort of 'catchin9-up process' in the wel fare state 
area. Oespite the effects of the 1977-1978 tax reform, the strenght 
of the foregoing driving forces outpaced the revenue potential. The 
tax share in GOP rose by almost 1.3 percentage points per year on 
average), resulting in public deficits and rising public debt. The 
ensuing increase in debt interest payments further compounded this 
difficulties by adding to government's precommitment of resources 
(see Table 1). 
On the eve of Community membership, both the share and 
the role of the public sector in the Spanish econorny were entirely 
different than they were in the mid-seventies. The initially prevailing 
consensus that a public sector expansion was required both to improve 
competitiveness and living standards and to consolidate social cohesion 
is now increasingly questioned, in view of the detrimental effects 
of sorne expenditure and tax programmes on resource allocation, economic 
incentives and international competitiveness. What has happened? 
How has ít affected the Spanish posítion vis-S.-vis the EEC countries? 
The present section briefly addresses these two questions. 
1) 'IUI'AL EXPnIDI'lURES 
· 
EOC 10 
· 
Spain 
2) 'IUI'AL REVmUES 
EOC 10 
Spain 
TABLE 1: MAIN PUBLIC ~ AGGRmATES 
(per cent of GIlP) 
1973 1981 1983 1985 
37.2 47.1 48.6 49.0 
22.7 35.6 38.8 42.5 
36.1 41.8 43.4 43.8 
23.8 31.7 34.0 35.5 
3) ~ DEFICIT (-) 
· 
EOC 10 -1.1 -5.3 -5.3 -5.2 
· 
Spain 1.1 -3.9 -4.8 -7.0 
4) GROSS PUBLIC llI2T 
· 
EOC 10 36.9 42.6 50.8 56.6 
· 
Spain 12.8 22.7 34.5 46.6 
5) llI2T :nmm:sT 
EOC 10 1.9 3.7 4.4 5.0 
· 
Spain 0.6 0.8 1.3 3.2 
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1986 1987 1988 
48.4 47.9 47.4 
42.2 41.4 40.5 
43.6 43.7 43.6 
36.1 37.8 37.5 
-4.8 -4.2 -3.8 
-6.1 -3.6 -3.0 
57.8 59.2 60.0 
47.6 48.1 48.5 
5.1 4.9 4.8 
3.9 3.6 3.3 
Sources: Canision de las Carnmidades E>Jropeas, Infonne Econáni.co Anual 1988-1989, 
Ministerio de Econan:ia y Hacienda, Madrid, 1989; Oro>, 0El:D Econani.c Surveys: 
~,Paris, may, 1989; Banco de España, Infonne Anual 1988, Madrid, june, 
1988. 
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8. FISCAL POLICY 
The financial position of the general government worsened 
steadily after 1973 as the financial balance deteriorated from a 
superavit of 1.1 points of GDP to a deficit of 5.6 percentage points 
in 1982. 
Most of this abrupt change in the sign of the government 
borrowing requirement had a structural nature. Important as i t was 
the negative effect on public accounts of GDP growth slowdown (channeled 
through reduced taxes and increased transfers 
workers l, OECD calculations 1 estimate the 
to firms and unemployed 
deterioration of the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance in 3.9 percentage points of potential 
GDP. Discretionary increases in personal taxes (2.4 GDP percentage 
points l and social security contributions (4.3 GDP percentage points l 
together wi th restraint in public investment were not large enough 
to counterbalance the tremendous rise in social expenditures (6.0 
per cent of GDPl, transfers to public and private enterprises (2.9 
per cent of GDPl and public consumption (3.8 GDP percentage pointsl. 
On average, two-thirds of the general government borrowing requirements 
were financed by the 8ank of Spain and the financial insti tutions 
(largely through compulsory coefficientsl. 
Over the 1982-1985 period a number of measures were 
implemented with important implications as to the stance and the 
mediurn-term effects of fiscal policy. The experience of the seventies 
led to disillusionment with 'fine-tunning', partly because the negative 
effects of discretionary expansion on inflationary expectations2 
and international competitiveness, part1y because the harmful impact 
of deficit financing upon investment3 , employrnené and debt dynamics5 
Recognition of the importance of improving public sector finances 
led to a deficit reduction of 0.6 GDP percentage points. This outcome 
nBlE 2: CIIAlm IN GEN!nL ~ 
ACOCUNTS, 1973-1985 
(per cent of GDP) 
1mm 1977/82 
l. CUrrent revE!llIeS 3.0 5.0 
l. Taxes. al prc:ductial and :iJn¡:Qrts -1.2 1.1 
2. Taxes al i..nccma and profi ts 1.0 1.9 
3. Social security cootriliitioos 2.8 1.5 
4. Other 0.4 0.5 
n. CUrrent Transfers 2.7 5.3 
1. Social transfers 1.9 3.6 
2. Interest al ¡m¡lic debt -0.1 0.5 
3. SUbsidies 0.5 1.1 
4. other 0.4 0.1 
m. Net disposable ioo:me 0.3 -0.4 
IV. Public~ 1.5 2.3 
V. Public i.nvest:mellt 0.1 0.4 
VI. capital revenues -0.1 0.0 
vn. capital transfers 0.3 1.0 
vm Fi nanc::l al deficit 1.7 5.0 
l!eui:AaudIa: 
Structural deficit* -1.4 -2.7 
Bank of Spain fj nanci ng 0.4 3.4 
1982/85 
3.1 
1.8 
1.7 
-0.1 
-0.3 
3.5 
0.9 
2.2 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.3 
0.6 
1.4 
0.2 
0.1 
1.4 
-0.1 
-2.2 
Soorces: J. Alcaide, "El gasto ¡xíblic:o en la demx:racia espafIola. las 
heclv:s". Papeles de Faxmía E:5paOO1a, 37, 1988; Banco de España, 
InfOI1De Anual (Apendice Estadistic:o), years 1983 and 1986; J.C. 
Qx:m-aqui, ''les déficit ¡xíblicos en los países de la CX::DE", Papeles 
de ECt'lxuda Española, 24, 1985; 0IIIl calculatioos. 
N:ltes: * A mus sign indicates a IIIJVEIDeIlt towards expansial 
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was achieved mainly through the operation of the built-in stabilizers, 
since the combined effects of a reduction in public investment (0.3 
per cent of GOP) arid a substantial increase in personal and indirect 
taxes and social security contributions (2.3 per cent of GDP) was 
largely offset by a continued rise in current expenditure. 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the three-year period 
preceeding EEC accession was the change introduced by the government 
in 1983-1984 in financing the deficit, which shifted away from the 
Bank of Spa.in resources by means of the creation of treasury bilIs 
(Pagarés del Tesoro). However, the beneficial . alIocational effects 
of orthodox deficit financing turned more difficult the attainment 
of the objective of halting the deterioration of the government deficit, 
which increased by 0.7 percentage points of GDP to 5.5 percent of 
GDP in 1984. 
The rapid increase in the share of curren.t expendi ture 
allocated to interest payments (2.2 points of GDP) obscured the efforts 
made to decelerate public expenditure growth. Thus, despite the increase 
in the tax burden and an important reduction in the rate of growth 
of social expenditures and transfers to enterprises, which put a 
stop to expansion in the structural deficit, the overalI government 
borrowing requirement rose to an unprecedented 7.0 per cent of GDP. 
At the end of 1985, the share of public debt in GDP reached 46. ti 
per cent, a figure that trebbled the 1979 share. 
C. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE POLICIES 
Economic expenditure categories 
In the early seventies. the share of general government 
expenditure in GDP was below the EEC average by 14.5 points (see 
9. 
Table 1). Expansion in public expendi ture has been quite uneven across 
economic components. As Table 2 shows, current transfers have been 
the most rapidly growing expenditure i tem, at an annual average rate 
of 1.0 per cent of GOP. Transfers to families and firms and unemployment 
benefits account for most of the expansion in the 1973-1982 period. 
Interest payments played this leading role over the three-year period 
ending in 1985. 
Growth of public consumption was more moderate (0.4 GDP 
percentage points per annum). Wages accounted for the largest part 
of the rise in public consumption. National accounts indicate, however, 
that the relative price effect of current consumption was weak by 
the end of the seventies and even turned negative during the eighties6 . 
This phenomenon reflects signi ficant wage mOderation, since the share 
of public salaries in GDP grew by more than 60 per cent between 1973 
and 1985, while the m.rnber of employees working in the public sector 
almost doubled. 
In the seventies, public investment played the role of 
escape valve of the pressures for fiscal restraint. As a result, 
the share of public fixed investment in GDP feH almost continuously 
until the early eighties. In the same lapse, total capital expenditure 
share rose due to substantial increases in capital transfers. In 
1982, the share of public investment picked up strongly, doubling 
in a five-year period to surpass the average European public investment 
share in GDP. 
Broad trends in major expenditure functions 
The changes in the structure of general government 
expenditures are summarized in Table 3. Four major government functions 
are distinguished: public goods, merit goods, income maintenance 
TABLE 3: TIIE SI'R1JC'IURE CIF GENmAL OOVERNMENJ' EXPENlJITURE 
BY FUn::'I'I00lL CXl!I'CllENTS 
(par cent of GDP) 
1970 1975 1980 1982 
l. Public Goods 4.3 4.6 5.3 5.6 
(1) Defence 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 
(2) General Public Serviees 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.6 
11. l/e1fare State 13.0 16.2 21.6 22.8 
(3) Herí t Goods 5.6 6.9 8.9 8.7 
• Education 1.9 2.1 3.3 3.0 
• Health 2.8 3.8 4.5 4.3 
• Houslng and Colecti ve Services 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 
(4) Incx:me Maíntenance 7.4 9.3 12.7 14.0 
• pensiOllS 4.0 5.6 8.6 9.2 
• Unemployment Cctnpensation 0.2 0.5 2.2 2.6 
• Other 3.2 3.2 1.9 2.2 
nI. M:ixed Ecalgny 4.8 4.2 6.2 9.3 
(5) Econanic Services 4.2 3.7 5.5 8.3 
• Investment 2.3 2.1 1.6 2.8 
• Subsidies and Transfers 1.9 1.6 3.9 5.5 
(6) Public Debt Interest 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.0 
'roI'AL EXPENlJITURE 22.1 24.9 33.1 37.7 
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1985 1986 1987 
6.1 6.3 6.2 
2.0 2.3 2.2 
4.1 4.0 4.0 
24.8 24.5 24.5 
9.9 9.8 10.0 
3.6 3.6 3.6 
4.5 4.4 4.4 
1.8 1.8 2.0 
14.9 14.6 14.5 
10.0 9.9 10.0 
2.9 2.9 2.7 
2.0 1.8 1.8 
11.6 11.8 11.4 
8.4 7.7 7.7 
2.9 2.8 2.9 
5.5 4.9 4.8 
3.2 3.9 3.6 
42.5 42.4 42.0 
Sources: Fundacion FIES-CEX:A. on the basis of data fran Contabidad Nacional de Esoaña (Instituto National 
de Estadistica) and Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas (IntervenciÓll General de la 
Administración del Estado). 
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and economic services. Public goods are intended to meet collective 
needs and represent the tradi tional domain for public intervention 
in the economy (national defense and general public servicesl. Merit 
goods (education, health, housing and collective servicesl can in 
principle be provided through the market. Public involvement in this 
area seeks justification on categorical equity grounds (equality 
of opportunity, social cohesion and other non-economic ob jecti ves l. 
Income maintenance outlays (pensions, unemployment compensation, 
sickness benefits and family allowancesl have the major purposes 
of cushionin.g people against income loss while preventing both poverty 
and specific market failures (externalities, moral hazard and the 
like). Finally, government 'mixed economy' interventions include 
the provision of economic services (infrastructure, subsidies, capital 
transfers and other outlays) for allocation purposes and the interest 
costs of deficit financing. 
Over the 1975-1982 period the big expansion of government 
occurred in the welfare state area, as it was the case of most OECD 
countries 7 . Expenditure on merit goods and income maintenance rose 
by 6.6 percentage points to 22.8 per cent of GDP in 1982. Within 
the merit goods category, the fastest growing i tem was education 
(43 per cent of relative increase in its GDP share), followed by 
housing (40 per cent on increase) and health (13 per cent). Income 
maintenance expenditure showed more dynamism in this seven-year períod 
(50 per cent of increase). Much of this was due to the growth of 
pension expenditures, which rose by 3.6 per cent of GDP. The share 
of GDP devoted to unemployment payments fivefolded between 1975 and 
1982. Expenditure in the remaining income maintenance categories 
-mostly family allowances- suffered a drastic reduction of 1 full 
percentage point of GDP which hal ved· their share in total general 
government expenditure. 
While in most developed countries expendí ture on public 
14 
Sehavior of the share of education expenditures in GOP 
reflect both an extension of coverage -particularly in non-compulsory 
levels- and a sharp increase in the number of teachers in public 
schoolsg. The later grew by 74 per cent to a payroll of 271 thousand 
teachers in 1985. Significant increases in the number of pupils in 
post-compulsory education, both general (SUP, with a 51 per cent 
growth) and professional (FP, with a 142 per cent rise) , explain a 
30 per cent increase in the enrollment rate for 15-year-olds. Increases 
in the number of pre-primary pupils (22 per cent) and university 
students (48 per cent) contributed as well to the observed rise in 
the share of education expenditures in GOP between 1975 and 1985. 
The upward trend experienced by the share of expendi ture 
on housing over the 1975-1985 period can be attributed to the 
consequences of the new legislation on housing policies passed in 
1978 and the ensuing 'housing plans' of 1981-1983 and 1984-1987. 
Under these programnes -intended to reduce the housing defici t while 
ensuring equal access through personal allowances and housing subsidies 
as well as to. boost economic activity in the construction sector-
733.7 thousand houses were built. Results of this new housing policy 
have not been particularly brilliant as to the number of finished 
houses per year over the 1981-1985 period, which was roughly in line 
wi th public housing achievements of the 1975-1980 period. Indeed, 
however, public finance played a more prominent role after the 1978 
legislation10• 
Health expenditure 
between 1975 and 1985. This 
an institutional explanation. 
experienced a 
out come may be 
Prior to 1986, 
very modest increase 
largely attributed to 
State transfers to the 
social security health services were given without earmarking. E{forts 
to provide resources for expansion of the pension benefits resulted 
in a restraint of heal th, expendi ture, whose share in GOP did not 
1 5 
change over the 1980-1985 period. Real benefits per health user have 
been the key factor behing the rise in the volume of health expenditure 
between 1975 and 1985. Increased coverage also contributed 
significantly to the expansion of real health outlays11 
Role of economic services and infrastructures 
As noted above, trends of public expenditure in pUblic 
services over the years 1975 to 1985 represent a noticeable departure 
from what i t may be observed for other developed countries in the 
same period of time. The information in Table·4 provides sorne help 
in explaining why did the share of these expendi tures in GDP more 
than double in the sort period of one decade. 
Following the first oil shock, gross public investment 
started a decline that was to be reversed only after 1981. Leaving 
aside the increased investment resources allocated to, provision of 
general public ser vices , the share in GOP of investment in education, 
agriculture, and transport an,d corrrnunications remained stable -despite 
compelling needs of infrastructure improvement- and the share of 
investment in health, housing and other sectors actually declined 
through the 1976-1981 period. After substantial investment increases 
in 1982 and 1985, capital resources channeled to most sectors of 
public involvement experienced rises (with the outstanding exception 
of health), particularly so in housing and transport and communications. 
Investment in these sectors doubled i ts share in GOP. Importance of 
this pick up can be enhanced by noting that it rose the share of 
public investment in GDP above the EEC-4 average. However, it remains 
doubtful that these isolated efforts did effectively narrow gaps 
with respect to Corrrnunity standards (see below). 
Regarding the role of the public sector in the provision 
'I'ABI1: 4: G!1lmAL ~ EXPmDI'ItIRE eN GROSS rrm> 
INVES'lliENl' ANO n:x:tOOC smvIC&S IN 1985: 
!EX: 4 ANO SPAIN 
(per cent of GlPI 
!EX: 1985 
GeImany France ltaly U.Kingrlgn ~ 
C2lSS r.rxm INV!S'OONl' 2.3 3.2 3.8 2.0 2.7 
l. General Public Services 
2. F.ducatial 
3. Health 
4. lIousing 
5 Agriculture 
6 Transport and o:mmicatials 
7. other 
D:X:N:HIC mMC&S M 3.9 7.4 4.4 4.8 
Al J)" mi e Sector' 
1. DIergy and Gas 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
2. ~ture 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.4 
3. KiniDg and Industl'y 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.3 
4. Transport and CaIm micatials 2.1 1.5 3.8 2.0 2.3 
5. other 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Bl '1'ipe ot Operatial 
1. SUhúdies 
2. capital Transfers 
3. FixEd Investmellt 
4. Vages 
5. other 
16 
SPAIN 
1976 1981 1985 
2.3 2.1 3.6 
0.1 0.2 0.4 
0.3 0.3 0.4 
0.3 0.2 0.2 
0.5 0.4 0.9 
0.3 0.3 0.4 
0.4 0.4 0.8 
0.4 0.3 0.5 
3.2 4.6 6.6 
0.2 0.2 0.4 
0.9 1.2 1.2 
0.3 0.7 1.2 
1.4 2.0 2.8 
0.4 0.5 1.0 
1.1 1.3 2.0 
0.5 1.2 1.7 
0.8 0.7 1.3 
0.4 0.6 0.6 
0.4 0.8 1.0 
Sources: K. L;;¡ares, R. Alvarez, l. Dlcabo, J.K. Galzález-Pámo and J.L. Ray¡rJ:ni, Niveles ele 
COOertura del Gasto Público en Fspaña, !\IIldaciál FIES-ax::A, mi.meo, july, 1988; ~ 
calculatials. 
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of economic services, inforrnation in Table 4 allows to establish 
two observations. First, expenditures in transport and comnunications 
and mining and industry explain two-thirds of the increase in the 
share of economic services in GDP. Second, the preferred method for 
expanding public involvement in these sector s was the provision of 
capi tal transfers and subsidies to both public enterprises and ailing 
industries under the industrial restructuring programmes initiated 
in the early eighties. 
Government expenditures vis-a-vis the 'EEC Standard' 
Table 5 shows the structure of general government 
expenditure in the largest four EEC countries (EEC-4) and in Spain 
in 1985. Italy stands out as the country with the closest resemblance 
to Spain in respect of the role of the public sector. A high share 
of expenditure in economic services and the relatively low shares 
in social security and housing relative to the EEC-4 averages are 
shared in comnon by Italy and Spain. 
Casual comparisons, however, cannot help to throw light 
on the question of where may Spain lag behind -and where it may already 
be ahead- of the EEC countries. Once it is recognized that each 
expenditure category has its own socio-economic and demographic 
determinants, it should be an acceptable conclusion that comparisons 
on the 'adequacy' of Spanish public expenditure priorities with respect 
to EEC averages need to be corrected for socio-economic and demographic 
differences existing between Spain and the EEC countries. 
12 This 'standardized comparison' can be rnade as follows . 
Let Y .. be the j-th expenditure share of country i, i: Federal Republic lJ 
of Germany, France, Italy and the Uni ted Kingdom. Estirnate an equation 
for every expenditure category using as explanatory variables the 
TABU: 5 : 'mE ~ C!' GnlERAL ~ 
EXI'!lIDl'nm IN 1985: m; 4 ANO SPAIN 
(in per cent of GIP) 
Germany FraIlee ltaly U. Kingrlgn 
l. General Public Services 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.l 
2. Defence 2.9 4.0 2.0 5.0 
3. n!ucatial 4.7 6.4 5.5 5.6 
4. IIeal.th 6.0 6.9 5.5 4.9 
5. Social Securi ty 19.7 22.1 15.9 13.8 
6. lIousing 1.0 3.2 1.5 3.2 
7. Other Social Servlces 0.7 1.1 0.3 
8. F<manic Servicesl 3.9 3.9 7.4 4.4 
9.~ 3.0 2.2 6.8 4.8 
'1ImL EKP!NDl'1'I.m: 46.5 54.1 49.5 45.9 
m; 4 ~ 
4.3 4.1 
3.5 2.0 
5.5 3.6 
5.9 4.5 
18.2 14.9 
·2.2 1.8 
. 0.6 0.9 
4.8 6.6 
4.0 4.0 
48.9 42.5 
Source: K. Lagares, R. Alvarez, l. &lcabo, J.K. Galzález-PáraJOO and J.L. R.ay1Iad, 
Niveles de Cobertura del Gasto PUblico en Espaiia, Flmac:iál FIES-ax:A, mimeo, 
july, 1988. 
Notes: 1 Includes: energy, gas, agriculture, mining, industry, transport, CXl!JIJ!micatials 
and other services. 
2 Public debt interest, aIIm1 other mioor expeoditures. 
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appropriate socio-economic and demographic variables: 
where k is an index for the determinants of the observed behavior 
of Y... Now use the observed socio-economic and demographic data lJ 
of Spain (i: o) to obtain: 
Finally compare actual expenditure shares, Y oj' with predicted shares, 
Yok .• 
oJ 
Table 6 shows the results of this exercise for the years 
1976, 1981 and 1985. As regards total expenditure, Spain has converged 
toward the 'EEC Standard' on a stable and sustained fashion. Trends 
in individual expenditure components have been diverse. In 1985 Spain 
la9ged behind the EEC 4 in national defense, education, housing, 
health and social security. On the contrary, i t was ahead in general 
public services, 'other' (interest payments on public debt essentially), 
economic services and 'other social services' (museums, press and 
information, radio, television, cinematography, theatre, music and 
other cultural services). 
These indications of 'need' can be further complemented 
with a selection of social policy and infrastructure indicators such 
as those arranged in Tables 7 and 8. The distances shown up by the 
indicators relevant to education, health, housing, unemployment, 
pensions and, above all, infrastructure, do not require further 
corrments. 
Decentralization of government expenditures 
The Spanish general government sector consists of three 
main agents: the Central- Government, the Social Security System and 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
TABlE 8: smx:nIl ~ lNDlCA'l'(l¡S 
IN 'mE E.E.C. ANO SPlIlN 
(circa 1985) 
Germany France 
I.ength of road networks (tbousand kilaneters) 492.8 801.4 
Road ldlcmeters par tbousand vehicles 18.4 33.8 
I.ength of IIDtonIays (thousmi kilaneters) 7.8 5.7 
tbtorway cIensi ty (kilaneters par square 
ldlcmeter of laOO) 30.0 9.7 
Prívate vehicles par tbousand capita 412.0 340.0 
passenqers-kilaneter by train (billioo) 38.4 60.3 
Passenqers-ldlcmeter by aircraft (billiaü 24.4 32.8 
Te1e¡:Vme sets par hUDdred capita 60.0 60.0 
Total factor prcxIuctivity ~ in postal 
services (par cent) 2.6 -0.2 
(10) Public expendi ture in transport mi '""" m; catims 
par square kilcmeter of lmi (1985 PPP Fcu) 6956 1820 
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ltaly U. KiIX!dan ~ 
297.0 370.9 167.2 
13.1 19.3 16.3 
5.7 2.9 2.0 
19.7 10.8 3.8 
366.0 304.0 229.0 
37.1 30.1 15.6 
13.6 43.6 16.5 
43.0 52.0 36.0 
-1.0 5.1 -6.0 
7103 4875 1189 
Soorce: Emostat, Elltadfsticas Básicas de la cammidad, ~,1987; lhúted Naticns O!:qanizaticn, 
stat:iscal Yearbook 1984, New York, 1986; S. Perelman mi P. Pestieau, "Technical performance in 
pJblic enterprises: A cx:mparati ve study of railways mi postal services", »gopean Ecamic Review, 
32, 1988, w, 432-441; H. Laqares, R. Alvarez, l.!ru:abo, J.H. Galzález-PáraIID mi J.L. RayuaxI, 
Niveles de CObertura del Gasto PúbliCXl en España, Fundaciál FIES-arA, mimeo., july, 1988; 0IIII 
calculaticns • 
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the Territorial Governments. The subnational public administrations 
are Regional Governments (Autonomías) and Local Authori ties (Provin 
cias and Municipios). Most of the Territorial Governments' resources 
come from State transfers through three channels: unconditional 
automatic transfers, transfers from an 'Interterritorial Compensation 
Fund' and government funds for earmarked purposes. 
On the eve of enactment of the Ccnstitution, the Territorial 
public sector's share in general government expenditure was very 
small. Since 1978 it has been continuously increasing, slowly at 
first, but quite rapidly after 1981. Between 1981 and 1985, the share 
of Territorial Governments in total public expenditure increased 
10 percentage points to 21.4 per cent (see Table 9). In 1985, the 
lower levels of government were accounting for the most part of total 
expenditures in housing, education, investment and other social 
services, and incresing responsibilities were being taken in the 
provision of health careo 
Further issues: Expenditure control and deficit spendin9 
As regards to the rapid increase of public expendi ture 
over the 1975-1985 period, tVlo factors may be singled out as having 
exerted a negative influence upon the assessment of spending needs. 
First, there exist identified budgetary practices that made it 
easy for spending departments to claim more resources than the amount 
approved in the budget 13. Among these are the following: 1) Special 
cash facilities (' anticipos') are available from the central bank 
up to a limit of 12 per cent of total budget appropriations 14; 
2) Initial budget plans tend to be widely exceeded by total final 
credits due to laxity in the concession of supplementary credits 
by the Parliament (these have averaged 13 per cent of initial 
appropriations over the first half of the eighties 15); 3) Unused 
'DBLE 9: mx:mnw.IZATICll C!' G!ll!lW. ~ EXPnlDl'ruRE 
(in per CEIlt of total expeDditure) 
1976 1981 
central1 Territorial2 central1 Territorial2 
Go'I't Govts Go'I't Govts 
1. General Public Services 76.1 23.9 72.5 27.5 
2. Defence 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
3. Fducatioo 96.2 3.8 86.2 13.8 
4. Health 93.8 6.2 91.9 8.1 
5. Social 5ecurity 96.7 3.3 97.0 3.0 
6. lbJsing SO.4 49.6 SO.l 49.9 
7. Other Social SeIvices 37.3 62.7 SO.6 49.4 
8. Emmic Services 87.8 12.,2 89.0 11.0 
9. Other 83.0 17.0 75.3 24.7 
'I\7l'AL Emlml'I'U!E 89.7 10.3 88.6 11.4 
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1985 
central1 Terri torial2 
Go'I't Govts 
68.6 31.4 
100.0 0.0 
45.2 54.8 
87.0 13.0 
96.1 3.9 
19.0 81.0 
23.9 76.1 
72.7 27.3 
83.8 16.2 
78.6 21.4 
Sources: !!. Laqares, R. Alvarez, l. &!cabo, J.!!. Gcozález-PáraIoo and J.L. Rayumd, Niveles de Cobertura 
del Gasto Publico en Espafia, !'trdadéa FIES-<ll:A, m:imeo, ju1y, 1988; 0HIl calcu1atials. 
li:ltes: 1 Includes central Administraticn and Social 5ecurity 
2 Includes Regicoal Govemments «('ar!m; darles AutIronaS) and 1.ocalities ~cipias). 
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appropriations resulting from a relatively low degree of realization 
of final credits (90 per cent on average) can be carried forward 
subject to some limitations. These practices, compounded by the lack 
of efficiency reviews and the failure of the modernization programme 
for expenditure management set in train in 198316 , have emptied the 
budget 'insti tution of i ts nature as a mean s to constrain and allocate 
public expenditure17• 
In the second place, the deficit itself may have caused 
or facilitated increases in public expenditures larger than would 
have obtained otherwise. Causality analysis has shown' causation from 
defici t finance to 90vernment expendi ture 18. Government' s power to 
print money and issue debt as an alternative to raising taxes has 
been used to overcome taxpayer' s resistance, making i t easier to 
expand public spending at the cost of increased future taxes and/or 
future spendin9 reductions. Empirical analysis attributes to deficit 
spending about one-fourth of the increase in the share of general 
90vernment expenditure in GDP between 1975 and 1986. 
D. TAX POLICIES 
The 1977-1978 tax reform 
The tax system operated by the government in 1975 exhibited 
two salient features. On the one hand, the total tax ratio (fiscal 
pressure) was well below the EEC average. As Table 10 shows, total 
tax revenues amounted 21.6 per cent of GDP, 13.1 percentage points 
less than the EEC average (excludin9 Spain) and one-half of the total 
tax ratio in the hi9hest tax country (Netherlands). Only Greece, 
Portugal and Italy had comparable tax ratios. 
On the other hand, the structural characteristics of 
Belgilml 
Denmark 
France 
GeImany 
Greece 
Ireland 
ltaly 
lJJxanOOurq 
Hetherlands 
I'crtugal 
IlU.ted ~ 
DX:1 
TnU 10 : GmDlAL ~ TAX REV!WES 
(per cent of (Ilp) 
m: 1975-86 
1975 illQ 1985 
41.1 43.5 46.6 
41.4 45.5 48.7 
36.9 41.7 44.5 
35.7 38.0 37.9 
24.6 . 28.6 35.2 
31.5 34.0 39.0 
25.1 30.0 34.7 
39.2 40.9 42.9 
43.9 45.8 45.1 
24.7 28.7 31.5 
35.4 35.3 38.1 
34.7 37.0 39.8 
SPAIN 1975-1988 
1986 
45.4 
50.6 
44.2 
37.5 
36.7 
40.2 
36.2 
42.4 
45.5 
32.4 
39.0 
40.1 
1975 
21.6 
1980 
26.9 
1985 
31.5 
1986 
32.7 34.32 
Soorces: C!X:D, Revenue statistics of C!X:D tmber Coontries, 1965-1985, Paris, 1988; 
!\mdac:i.ál ~-ax:A, CIIadernc6 de Informaciál Ecctlémica, 20, december, 1988. 
Notes: 1 lIeighed average exclud:illg Spain (1985 GDP weights and exc:bange rates) 
2 Estimate (!\mdac:i.ál ~-ax:A) 
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the tax system were such that made it unsui table to contribute to 
the modernization of the economy that was to come. As Table 11 shows, 
almost one-half of tax revenues carne from social security contributions, 
nearly 30 per cent were provided by indirect taxes and less than 
20 per cent carne from personal and corporate taxes. Prominent amcng 
indirect taxes was a cascading-type tax on business turnover (Impuesto 
sobre Tráfico de Empresas), which plagged domestic transactions with 
non-neutrali ties and distorted the pattern of external trade. Personal 
income taxes were levied by means of a 'mediterranean-style' cedular 
system: cedular taxes worked as minimum levies that taxed independently 
different sources of income. Presumptive tax base determination was 
widely used. High-income taxpayers were liable to a so-called 'general 
income tax', a progressive tax on gross income against which cedular 
taxes paid could be credited19 . 
Taken as a whole, the tax system inheri ted from the 1964 
reform scored poorly with regard to the most basic principIes of 
taxation. Practical absence of personalization elements and rigidity 
of tax bases made i t unlikely that the tax system could be of much 
help in financing public policies while preserving sufficiency, equity, 
neutrality and flexibility. Further, the tax system that was in place 
in the mid-seventies was seen as an impcrtant obstacle in the process 
of convergence towards integration in the EEC. 
Urged by the strength of social pressures for expenditure 
increases, tax reform becarne a top priori ty in the poli tical agenda 
simultaneous with the change of political regime. In November 1977 
a number of exceptional measures were adopted to increase revenues 
(surtaxes on business profits, highest personal incomes and luxury 
goods), while signaling the government' s purpose of overhauling the 
tax system and changing attitudes towards compliance (, tax arnnesty', 
abolition of confidentiality in bank operations, creation of an 
(1) Incaoe Taxes 
• Personal 
• Corporate 
TABLE 11: S'mOC'ruRE OF TAX BY SOORCE 
(per cent of total tax revenues) 
SPAIN 
1985 1975 1980 1985 
33.8 18.5 22.2 23.6 
26.5 12.6 17.6 18.5 
7.3 5.9 4.6 5.1 
(2) Social Security Cootributioos 29.7 46.1 48.7 41.7 
(3) Property Taxes 4.0 3.5 4.3 4.1 
(4) Coosumption Taxes 29.8 27.7 18.1 24.3 
• General 16.3 12.9 6.5 11.9 
• Excises 13.5 14.8 11.6 12.4 
(5) other taxes 2.7 4.2 6.7 6.3 
1986 1987 1988 
22.5 27.9 28.2 
17.0 21.1 21.6 
5.5 6.8 6.6 
40.4 38.4 37.9 
3.8 3.1 3.8 
30.3 27.8 27.5 
17 .2 15.9 15.8 
13.1 11.9 11. 7 
3.0 2.8 2.6 
Sources: OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1987, Paris, 1988 (for EEC 1985); 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Contabilidad Nacional de España, 1970-77, Madrid, 1981 
(for Spain 1975); Banco de España, Informe Anual 1987, Madrid, Hay, 1988. 
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'extraordinary net wealth tax' and introduction of heavy penalties 
against 'fiscal crime'l. 
One year later, the Par liament passed the new personal 
income tax and corporate tax laws, enacted in January 1979, altogether 
with the elimination of cedular taxes, which were partly transferred 
to the local governments. The new income tax was a modern global 
(synthetic l progressive tax on net income accruing to family members, 
Allowances were granted to provide for family size, other personal 
characteristics and tax incentives, The reformed corporation income 
tax was structured in line with profits taxes operated in European 
countries, Changes in the indirect tax legislation were relatively 
less marked, 
Broad trends in taxation 
All in all, the 1977-1978 tax reform improved the buoyancy 
of the tax system as a whole, The estimated tax elasticity rose from 
1.11 in the 1970-1977 period to 1.22 in 1978-19852°. As a result 
of the tax reform provisions, the share of current income and wealth 
taxes in GOP rose to 8.5 percentage points, doubling the 1975 figure. 
The overall tax ratio 9rew by 1.0 percentage GOP points per annum 
on average, twice as fast as taxes grew both in the 1965-1975 years 
and in the EEC (average l between 1975 and 1985. Notwithstanding, 
this acceleration did not prove large enough to finance the huge 
public spending increases that took place in the same periodo 
As regards to taxes other than income taxes, social security 
contributions kept in pace with growth in total taxes until 1980, 
stabilizing their share in GOP thereafter. Indirect taxes fell both 
as a proportion of total taxes and in their share in GOP between 
1977 and 1979, strong ly recovering afterwards. Overall, changes in 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
TABl.E 1.2: »H.ll\L A'mWlE cam;&S ni 'IlX&S, 1975-1985 
(per cent of GIlP) 
msm 1977/80 
Taxes al Persalal Ino:me 0.1 0.7 
Taxes al Corporate Ino:me -<l.1 0.0 
Sccial Security CcIltributials 0.8 0.5 
Taxes al Prod\Icti.ál 0.1 0.1 
Taxes al Imports 0.0 -<l.4 
other 0.3 -<l.O 
1980/85 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.5 
0.0 
-<l. 1 
fb1rces: 00::0, Revenue statistics of 00::0 Member CoI.mtries. 1965-
1987, Paris, 1988. 
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tax structure and tax trends led general government revenues more 
close to EEC standards. In 1985, the Spanish total tax ratio was 
20 per cent lower than the EEC average, one-half of the relative 
gap that was observed ten years ear lier. Though still higher (lower) 
than the EEC average, the share of social security contributions 
(income taxes) in total tax revenues decreased (increased) by almost 
7 percentage points over the 1975-1985 period. The share of consumption 
taxes is broaoly in line with the EEC average. 
The main taxes in 1985 
On the eve of EEC membership, the personal income tax 
was levied on family income at rates rising to 66 per cent, with 
total tax l imi ted to 46 per cent of the tax base. The income base 
included labor, business and capital income (including imputed housing 
rent and capital gains), as well as most transfers (sickness and 
unemployment benefits were the most noticeable exceptions). Deductions 
included a basic allowance of 1 per cent of earned income, social 
security contributions paid by employees and interest related to 
a source of income. There existed extensive credits based on family 
circumstances, ·residential investment, medical expenses, insurance 
and life assurance premiums, dividend income (providing modest partial 
integration of corporate and personal tax) and a range of other expenses 
and investments. Provisions for automatic inflation adjustment did 
not existo From 1982 to 1984 there were attempts to increase the 
effective progressivity of the income tax by steepening the rate 
structure. 
Corporate income tax was levied at arate of 35 per cent. 
There was no inflation relief for inventories and LIFO was not accepted 
by the tax authorities. Accelerated depreciation was allowed for 
certain assets, and there were tax credits for many investments and 
employment creation. Investment tax credits equaled 15 per cent of 
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the cost of investment. Tax expendi ture for job creation amounted 
to half a million Ptas. per jobo The revenue cost of both tax credits 
totalled more than one-third of the 1985 tax bill. 
Social security contributions were assessed on wages 
between prescribed limits at a usual rate of 36.4 per cent (30.4 per 
cent on employers and 6 per cent on employees). Contribution rates 
on employers. were among the highest in the EEC. Since 1900, social 
security reform has cut contribution rates and reduced dispersion, 
partly by broadening the base. 
Tax rates of the cascading-type tax on gross sales ranged 
from 0.5 per cent (wholesale commerce) to 6 per cent (electricity) , 
wi th a most common rate of 4 per cent. Local surcharges were levied 
at rates between 0.2 per cent (wholesale trade) and a standard surtax 
of 1 per cent. 
II. THE '1986 CUM 1992' SHOCKS: CHALLENGES ANO POLICIES 
A. POLICY RESPONSES TO THE EEC SHXK 
Fiscal policy 
The integration of Spain in the EEC in 1986 -a relatively 
low-inflation area- and the 1arge deterioration of the public finances 
occurred in 1985 demanded from the economic authorities a change 
in the stance of fiscal policy. While 1985 fiscal events represented 
a major setback in ·the efforts to improve public sector finances 
ini tiated in 1983, 1986. wi tnessed a return to the trend cf lower 
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budget sector deficits and reduced borrowing requirements. 
As Table 13 shows, over the years 1986 and 1987 revenues 
increased faster than previously, due mostly to rises in direct taxes. 
On the other hand, for the first time since 1966 the share of current 
transfers in GDP experienced a reduction, an outcome attributable 
to both the action of automatic stabilizers (unemployment benefi ts 
and subsidies) and to the effects of the 1985 reform of the pension 
system. As a result of these trends, public sector disposable income 
increased markedly (3.8 per cent of GDP in the 1986-1987 period). 
Moderate increases in public consumption made possible a sharp 
improvement in gross savings from a negative 2.6 per cent of GDP 
in 1985 to a positive 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1987. 
The set of fiscal policy indicators arranged in Table 
14 shows that resumption of the trend toward greater fiscal restraint 
observed in 1986 was strenghthened in 1987. Improvements in tax 
collection and administration (partly attributable to the introduction 
of VAT) and control exerted over current expenditures and public 
investment explain reductions in the cyclically-adjusted deficit 
of 1.1 per cent of potential GDP in 1986 and 1.4 per cent of potential 
GDP in 1987. Reduction of the nonfinancial deficit in 1986 and the 
strong expansion of economic activity explain the observed reductions 
in the primary deficit (elliminated through 1987) and the remarkable 
cut-off of the nonfinancial deficit in 1987 to 3.6 per cent, half 
of its size two years back. 
Fiscal developments in 1988 were somewhat mixed. Despi te 
the reductions in nominal tax rates and the increase in the exemption 
level of the income tax, the combined effects of a stronger-than-
-anticipated growth and the inflationary fiscal drag21 turned the 
projected fall of the direct tax ratio into a slight reduction. Extra 
'l'ABU: 13: GOO'nL ~ cm!ATIctlS 
(per oent of GI»') 
1985 1986 
ammr~ 34.5 35.6 
Taxes 00 Prcducticn and Im¡xlrts 9.6 10.7 
Taxes 00 Ino:me and \leal th 8.5 8.3 
SOcial. Securi ty Cootributioos 13.2 13.0 
Other 3.2 3.6 
amm 'l'RAHSÍ'!IlS 22.5 22.1 
SOcial. Security Benefits 14.9 14.6 
Interest 00 Public Debt 3.3 3.8 
SUbsidies 2.6 2.1 
Other 1.7 1.6 
Nill' ~ m:xJIE 12.0 13.5 
JUlLIC CXfiSlf!I"l'I( 14.0 14.0 
W8Qes 10.7 10.5 
NetPurchases 2.7 2.9 
Fila!d capital Depreciatioo 0.6 0.6 
CAPITAL REVIlll&S 0.4 0.5 
CAPl'I'AL~ 2.3 2.4 
PIIlLIC IiIV:tS 1l!OWl' 3.7 3.7 
Nill' ~ <mIClT:-) -7.0 -6.1 
HeuamhJn: 
Total Taxes 31.5 32.1 
Total expemi tures 42.5 42.2 
Gross savings -2.6 -0.5 
1987 "1988 
37.3 36.8 
10.3 10.0 
10.3 10.0 
13.0 12.7 
3.7 3.7 
21.4 20.9 
14.4 14.2 
3.6 3.3 
1.7 1.8 
1.7 1.6 
15.8 15.9 
14.4 14.2 
10.4 10.4 
3.4 3.2 
0.6 0.6 
0.5 0.7 
2.0 1.8 
3.6 3.7 
-3.6 -3.0 
33.7 33.4 
41.4 40.5 
1.4 1.7 
Salrce: Banro de España, Informe Anual (years 1987 and 1988), 
Hadrid, 1988 and 1989. 
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'I'ABLE 14: GENrnAL 00'm00IENI' OPERATIOOS: 
SELEX:TED FISCAL POLlCY INDlCATCItS 
(per cent of GIlP) 
1985 1988 1980 
(1) Total receipts 43.8 43.6 30.0 
(2) Total outlays 49.0 47.4 32.6 
(3) Nonfinancial deficit (-) -5.2 -3.8 -2.6 
(4) Gross public debt 56.6 60.0 17.7 
(S) Debt interest payments 5.0 4.8 0.7 
(6) Pril!lary deficit (-) 1 -0.2 0.1 -1.9 
(7) Deficit required for stahility 2 -2.5 -2.7 -0.6 
(8) Cyclica11y-adjusted deficit (-) 3 -3.3 -3.2 -1.2 
(9) Change in noofinancial deficit 4 -10.1 -10.4 -0.2 
(10) Change in cyclica11y-adjusted deficit • -10.4 -0.2 -0.1 
Me!rorandun: 
GIlP gm¡th 2.5 3.5 1.2 
Inflatioo 5.9 3.5 15.6 
SPAlN 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
35.5 36.1 37.8 37.5 
42.5 42.2 41.4 40.5 
-7.0 -6.1 -3.6 -3.0 
46.6 47.6 48.1 48.2 
3.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 
-3.8 -2.2 0.0 -10.3 
-2.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 
-4,6 
-3.5 -2.1 -2.4 
-2.2 -10.9 +2.5 -10.6 
-0.9 +1.1 +1.4 -0.3 
2.3 3.3 5.5 5.3 
8.2 8.7 5.4 5.1 
Sources: OEX:D, Econcxn:ic OJtlook, 40 and 44, Paris, 1986 and 1988; OEX:D, OEX:D Econroic Surveys: 
~, Paris, may, 1989; canisión de las Canunidades Europeas, InformeEconánico Anual 
1988-89, Ministerio de Econania y Hacienda; llaneo de Espafia, Informe Anual 1988, 
Madrid, june 1989; 0IiIl calculations. 
Notes: 1 Line (3) mus line (S). 
2 Calculated as the net debt ratio multiplied by gl (1+g) , lIhere 9 is the naninal 
medium-term growth rate of GIlP. 'Ibis figure gives the deficit required for 
stahilization of the debt ratio at a given year' s level in an eco!lCX1W gro¡ing at its 
medium-tenn gwrth ratio under the current tax laws and spending plans (g takes 
values of 0.07 for the m:: and 0.08 for Spain). 
3 Par cent of potential GIlP (1985 GIlP weights and exchange rates). 
4 Year-to-year changes (a.positive sign indicates a movernent towards restrictionl. 
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receipts -which remained stable as a share of GDP due to the economic 
boom- were used to finance extra expenditures. Current subsidies 
actually increased their share in GDP and capital transfers overshot 
the budget target, increasing over 21 percentage points wi th respect 
to the 1987 outcome. Public investment and public consumption remained 
stable at their 1985 GDP shares. 
All in all, the outturn of the 1988 fiscal policy was 
an increase in the cyclically-adjusted deficit of 0.3 per cent of 
potential GDP. The observed reduction in the nonfinancial deficit 
was entirely attributable to the operation of built-in stabilizers. 
Perspectives for 1989 are of a likely continuation of the pro-cyclical 
stance of fiscal policy. Unexpected fiscal events -unconsti tutionality 
of income accumulation under the personal income tax rules, with 
a projected fiscal cost of 210 billion Ptas. j restructuring of 
expenditure in favor of pensions and unemployment benefits adopted 
as a consequence of a general strike in December j reduction by half 
of social securi ty contributions for new permanent job creationsj 
and a continued rise of 'interest rates well above the Budget 
projections) and the expected expenditure increases along the lines 
of the 1989-1992 macroeconomic and budget scenario, coupled with 
a likely increase in the deficit of Territorial governments, make 
it difficult to reduce general government deficit below 3 per cent 
of GDP as projected in the 1989 Budget. In any case, even i f recent 
developments have a negligible impact, the public sector structural 
deficit is projected to increase in 1989 by an amount comparable 
to that of 198822 . 
Taxation 
The most noteworthy tax event of 1986 was the introduction 
of the largely-harmonized consumption-type European VAT. It replaced 
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a complex and distortionary set of gross turnover taxes (Impuesto 
sobre Tráfico de Empresas, Impuesto de Lujo and other minor taxes). 
VAT has a standard rate of 12 per cent (the lowest standard rate 
in the EEC). Necessities and luxuries are taxed at rates of 6 and 
33 per cent, respectively. 
Although estimates indicate that introduction of VAT 
added about two percentage points to the rate of inflation, its overall 
impact has been highly beneficial. Neutrality in external trade has 
been substantially improved, double taxation of investment has been 
abolished and the economy' s taxable base has been greatly expanded 
both directly and through the cross-check control of economic 
transactions. As a result of VAT introduction, indirect tax revenues 
grew by almost 33 per cent in 1986, which represented 1.1 addi tional 
percentage points in GOP. Loss of buoyancy of indirect taxes in 1987 
and 1988 may be attributed to the reduction in import taxes, the 
fall in oil-product prices and the increased VAT contributions to 
the EEC Budget. 
Excise taxes experienced important changes with the EEC 
membership. While sorne excises were simply abolished (Impuesto de 
Lujo, Renta del Monopolio de Tabacos and other minor levies), other 
suffered legal reform to make the overall indirect tax structure 
comparable to those existing in EEC countries and the average level 
of tariffs was halved by January 1989. 
Abolition of frontier controls in 1992 will require 
substantial convergence of tax rates of both VAT and excises. The 
comparatively low shares in GOP of VAT and excises in Spain (40 and 
23 80 per centof the EEC averages, respectively ) provides sorne room 
for future tax increases. Elimination of barriers to capital movements 
in the Internal Market will require additional tax reform efforts 
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in other areas, such as capital income taxation and social securi ty 
financing (see below). 
Public expenditure and the EEC Budget 
Spain' s accession to the EEC has brought two interesting 
novelties relevant to public expenditure practices. First, in 1986 
the Spanish economy became a contributor to/beneficiary from the 
EEC Budget. Second, the creation of the Internal Market in 1992 has 
been a factor behind the introduction of medium-term objectives in 
year-to-year budgetary plans (Macroeconomic and Fiscal Scenario 1989-
-1992) • 
Table 15 shows the nature of the bilateral financial 
flows between Spain and the EEC over the 1986-1989 periodo Contributions 
by Spain have not increased the deficit of the general government 
sector due to a slightly favorable balance. Most of the EEC 
expenditures in Spain are current transfers (subsidies) from EAGGF 
(FEOGA) under the Common Agricultural Policy and from ESF (FSE). 
Among the remaining expenditures, capital transfers from ERDF (FEDER) 
are the most relevant item. To the extent that non-agricultural projects 
are met by EROF and ESF in a gi ven fraction of the total cost, the 
EEC budget may have favored investment in basic infrastructure. This 
effect is likely to strenghthen in the 1990-1992 period as structural 
funds expand after the Council a9reement on budget discipline (February 
1988). However, given both the lack of sufficiently redistributive 
criteria in project financing and the limited size of resources managed 
by the community24 -about 1 per cent of GDP and 3 per cent of general 
government expenditure-, significant reductions in Spain' s basic 
infrastructure deficiencies cannot be expected from EEC policies. 
Data contained in Table 3 and recent estimates of the 
'1'AIIU: 15: 'mE catUIl'I"i BUlXlIJI': BIlATDW. 
FINAIl:IAL nM SPAlN-E.E. C. 
(in par cent of GIlP) 
1986 1987 
l. o:NI'Rll!t11'IC BY SPAlll' 
l. Tradicialal "Own Resources" 0.12 0.21 
2. VAT Calt:ribJticns 0.20 0.15 
3. QlP Calt:ribJticns 
'rol'AL 0.32 0.36 
II. <nH.IlIT'l EmNDrruRE m SPAIN 
1. EAGGF' -<luarantee 0.15 0.30 
2. EAGGF-Guidance 0.01 
3. llUl!" 0.13 0.13 
4. ESJ'l 0.07 0.10 
5. other 0.00 0.00 
'rol'AL 0.35 0.54 
m. !'DWCAL BAIm::E 0.04 0.18 
19882 
0.27 
0.30 
0.08 
0.65 
0.65 
0.04 
0.18 
0.13 
1.01 
1.01 
0.36 
19893 
0.23 
0.40 
0.11 
0.74 
0.53 
0.05 
0.20 
0.15 
0.02 
0.95 
0.20 
Sources: A. Gallego Y K. Seb:astiá, Historia presup.¡estaria ele la 
adhesiál ele EspafIa a las canunidades DJ.ropeas, Instituto ele 
ElJtudios Fiscales, Madrid, 1989. 
H:ltes: 1 Net CXIlt:ribJticns to the m: BOOqet 
2 ElJtimate. 
3 BudgetaJ:y forecast (naninal GIlP gt'OIIth asS\IIled to be 8.4 
par cent). 
4 l>Jropean Agricu1tural Qtidande and Qmantee !\md. 
S l>Jropean Re9ialal Deve1a¡:ment !\md. 
6 ~ Social !\md. 
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structure of general government disposable 
distances with respect to the EEC standard s 
and infrastructure outlays have not been 
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, 25 lncom€ indicate that 
of social expenditures 
significantly shortened 
over the 1985-1988 period. Expenditure in goods and services gained 
0.4 percentage points of share in GDP, an amount which was devoted 
to housing and collective services (0.2 per cent), gross investment 
(0.1 per cent) and education (0.1 per cent). General public services 
and heal th actually lost some share and national defense remained 
in 1988 at its 1985 level. 
Government expendi ture plans up to 1992 were made public 
when submitting a medium-term macroeconomic 
accompanied 1989 Budget proposals to the 
and fiscal scenario that 
26 
Parliament Assuming a 
moderate slowdown of GDP growth to 4.4 per cent and a steady reduction 
in the inflation rate to 3 per cent, total expenditure is projected 
to rise 1.3 points of GDP between 1988 and 1992. Pensions (0.6 
percentage points of GDP share), infrastructures (0.5 percentage 
points), education (0.4 percentage points), transfers to Territorial 
governments (0.3 percentage points) and health (0.2 percentage points) 
are expected to benefit both from a substantial increase in the total 
tax ratio (4.3 points of GDP in four years, evenly distributed across 
direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions) and 
a slowdown in subsidies and capital transfers (1.1 GDP percentage 
points) and public debt interest payments (0.3 per cent of GDP). 
Unexpected fiscal events previouly mentioned could significantly 
alter in practice these expenditure priorities, regarding mostly 
to pensions, infrastructures and interest payments. 
Privatization 
In order to get some grasp of the role and the relative 
performance of the public, enterprise in Spain, Table 16 arranges 
TABU: 16 : raE CF '!'!lE PllBLIC ~SE 
IN '!'!lE SPANISII DlHliY IN 1985 
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1. ll!!ployment (employees) 
IN! (63 fÍI'l!lS) 
IN!! (7 fÍI'l!lS ) 
DG PatrilraU.o (14 fÍI'l!lS) 
Telefónica 
Renfe 
Financial enteIlrises 
otber 
2. Value Mded (billim ptas.) 
Q:mrtmi catioos 
'J.'obaca:¡ 
Transport by sea and air 
Coal 
Oil 
Electrici ty 
Metallie mi.nerals 
Autarohiles and transport materials 
Qmnerce and repairs 
otber 
3. Productiro (bi] Ji ro ptas.) 
4. ~ (billiro ptas.) 
5. Gross Fixed Investment (bi 11 i ro ptas.) 
6. JI" mi e and ri nanci al Ratios (I¡) 
GrO!Ith in sales 
GrO!Ith in exports 
GrO!Ith in value added 
IIet profits/llet assets 
External financi.al expenses/Procluctial 
• SUMidieslProductiM 
Ahsolute value 
4OO.WJ 
187.000 
21.000 
19.WJ 
66.000 
60.000 
56.WJ 
11.000 
2.534,2 
533,2 
225,0 
150,5 
60,0 
210,2 
250,0 
126,2 
156,9 
539,6 
282,8 
5.458,4 
1.174,3 
834,4 
6,92 
6,22 
6,22 
capital transfers/Gross f:ixed :investment 
- 2,12 
12,62 
7,32 
17,02 
Sbare in Natialal Ecalany (I¡) 
4.5 
(EEl: 4/12.3)1 
10.6 
100.0 
100.0 
67.6 
36.9 
36.9 
28.4 
26.1 
21.4 
13.2 
1.7 
-10.0 
9.1 
15.9 
1m: 4: 27.7)1 
11.73 
9.53 
11.02 
6.13 
7.23 
0.23 
6.13 
~: Ministerio de F/:xroDfa y Hacienda. El Sector P6blico lil!mr!>AArW 1985. Kadrid, 1987; 
P. Ortiz Y A. GáDez, ''La DI;lresa Pública en el Ccntexto de la Ccntabllidad 
Et:aiánica" , Papeles de f<rnctni a tspafiola. 38, 1989; Central de Balances (Banco de 
Egpaña), Análisis Ft:ay'mico-Financi.ero 1984-85. Vol. I., Kadrid. R. lIyro ''Las 
DIIpresas Públicas", en J.L. Garcia Delgado ((\ir),~, Vol II: Fcamja, E5pasa-
Calpe, Madrid, 1988; 0Im calculatioos. 
Notes: 1 1982 (l!eighted average) 
2 Publie enterprises 
3 Private enterprises 
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a set of relevant indicators. Compared to the EEC average, the relative 
weight of public enterprises in the Spanish econorny in 1985 was quite 
small. Public enterprise shares varied greatly between sectors. In 
tenns of value added, the public share in 1985 exceeded 25 per cent 
in corrrnunications, tobacco, transport (by sea and air) , coal, 
electricity, mining and metallic minerals. 
~r 1985, at the same time that other liberalization measures 
were adopted (financial system, insurance, foreign capital transactions 
and internal corrrnerce 27), deregulation of public monopolies required 
by EEC policies was implemented (oil products, telecorrrnunications, 
tobacco and television) and a privatization programme was launched. 
As a result of the oil crisis of the mid-seventies, INI, 
Spain' s largest holding company, was used as 
i t absorbed employment and activities from 
an escape valve, as 
failed or bankrupt 
enterprises. Losses mounted rapidly, reaching almost 1 per cent of 
GOP in 1983, with the burden of financing largely falling on the 
budget. The need to rationalize the public sector enterprise sector 
led to adoption of important policy decisions. Absorption of pri vate 
finns halted, employment was reduced, growth in wages was contained, 
financial management was restructured and a process of retrenchment 
in sorne areas -those where government invol vement was not seen as 
essential- was started. 
Privatization in Spain has taken two routes: sale of 
total ownership to private concerns (Secoinsa, SKF Española, Viajes 
Marsans, Entursa, SEAT, ISSA, CABSA, PAMESA and MADE are sorne of 
the most significant among more than thirty sales affecting about 
25 thousand employees) and sale of minori ty holdings through the 
28 
stock exchange (GESA, ENCE, ENDESA and REPSOL) . While this open 
process has not been as far reaching as in other countries, it 
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can be said that both the financial posi tion of the public sector 
and . the efficient allocation of resources nave benefited frorn 
privatization and restructuring of the public enterprise sector. 
B. OUTSTANDING DISTORTIONS AND EEC INTEGRATION 
Taxation disincentives and econornic performance 
Analysis of the consequences of legal 'tax provisions 
and increased levels of taxation is crucial to any cornprehensive 
assessment of the impact of the Spanish public sector upon economic 
performance. This is particularly true in the context of convergence 
towards the Internal Market, since the dornestic detrimental effects 
of taxation will be cornpounded by risks of tax base flight. 
As Tables 11 to 13 above show, social security contributions 
in Spain are high relative to EEC standars (despite sorne reductions 
operated in recent years), personal income taxation is relatively 
small (although strong increases have taken place over the 1985-1988 
period) and corporate taxation is li9ht (due to the extension of 
tax credits). This tax mix is particularly relevant in a situation 
of hi9h unemployment. On the one hand, there is evidence that the 
demand for labor is hi9hly sensiti ve to changes in the real wage 
and the relative labor cost29 . On the other hand, empirical work 
has found a surprisingly high impact of the rise in the tax wedge 
on labor upon the increase in NAIRU in the first half of the eighties30 . 
Detrimental employment effects of an increased tax wedge 
were somewhat cushioned in the 1979-1984 period by reductions in 
the take-home payo However, this has not been the case in the 
1984-1987 period, over which gross earnings and take-horne pay of 
the average production worke.r have grown at broadly similar rates. 
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This is precisely the time in which marginal tax rates on incomes 
earned by an average production worker increased the most since the 
income tax was introduced in 197931 . Once account is taken of the 
fact that social security contributions have remained relatively 
stable in recent years and that the average effective marginal rates 
on capital incomes have been experiencing important reductions since 
1979 (from more than 36 per cent to less than 5 per cent in 198632 ), 
it can be' ·safely concluded that tax policy has not positively 
contributed to the expansion in employment observed over the 
1986-1989 periodo 
Risin9 marginal income tax rates may have 
non-negligible effect on labor supply as well. Evidence 
had a 
suggests 
that a major channel of detrimental effects upon labor supply is 
the negative relationship found between marginal tax wedges and female 
participation rates33 , compounded by income accumulation under the 
personal income tax -recently declared unconstitutional- and the 
relatively strong effect of the inflationary fiscal drag upon marginal 
34 
tax rates • A different polential source of distortions of labor 
supply decisions comes through the combined impact of changes in 
social security contributions and expectations of future pensions 
upon retirement decisions. Empirical work has found a positive effect 
of these (i. e. the income effect of increases in contributions 
counterbalances both the negative substitution effect and the negative 
income effect of pensions), although quite small in magnitude35. 
The structure of marginal tax rates is also relevant 
to 'black economy' and tax evasion decisions. Available studies indicate 
that about 27 per cent of workers did not pay social security 
contributions in 198636. In this same year, some 36 per cent of liable 
tax uni ts under the personal income tax did not submit tax returns 
and non-declared incomes were estimated in 45 per cent of the potential 
TABlE 17: PmSll.1IL DmiE TAX ni '1lIE E. E. C. 
TAl( RATES ANO 0I'Im( ASPB:l'S 
Tax Rates1 Tax Tax Uút2 lnIble Taxatial of3 
Di videDds: DeQree 
ltiniJJun ~ Elastici ties IOOividual Famjly of Correctien (%) 
Germany 22 56 1.63 Optioo Splitting 100.0 
Belgium 25 75 1.48 Spec.rules 66.3 
Denmark 45 68 1.37 le 33.3 
Spajn 25 56 1.78 ~en Spec.rules 18.6 
France 9 56.8 D.a. QJotient 69.0 
Greece 18 50 1.72 le 100.0 
Nether lands 14 72 1.70 le 0.0 
Ireland 35 58 1.55 Optial Spec.rules 60.7 
~ 10 56 n.a. twtient 0.0 
Portuqal 16 40 n.a. Cred:it 24.2 
U.~ 25 40 1.52 Opticn Spec.rules 61.9 
SOUrces: E. Albi, ''Ilspaña y las COIrlentes reformadoras ele la fiscalidad" , 
tmversidad CaDplutense (CUrsas ele Veraoo), mimeo, 1989; J.K. Gcnzález-
!'kaJlO, ''La integradLn ele los i.m¡x¡estos perscnal Y societario en los 
paises cIesarrollados: Ia:cicnes del análisis o:cnpar:ado", lloc:I.Ioo!lto ele 
Trabajo, 9/88, Instituto ele Estudios Fiscales, Kadrid; l. ArqiJrál and J. 
1Iarin, ''La prooresividad ele la ilrpiciál sobre la renta", mimeo., 1989. 
!tites: 1 IncJ.udes local taxes. 
2 ~t is taken of the Spanish oovezment proposal to adapt legal 
provisicns to the Ccnstituticnal <nlrt rulID,¡ en joint taxatial. 
3 COrrectien is achieved t:hroogh impo.¡tatien of tu credits (BelgillD, 
Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland, ltaly and Unitetl KiIqm), deducticn of 
dividends paid fran oorpotate taxable incaoe (Greece), different tu rates 
en divideDds and retenticns (Portugal) and a mix of impo.¡taticn and 
different tu rates (Germany). lJ.Ixembcm'q and the Netherlands do not 
provide relief for dooble taxatial of dividends. 
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tax base 37. While recognizing the relevancy of factors other than 
the tax rate as to the tax evasion decision (source of incorne, family 
status, probability of audit, size of penalties and the like), available 
evidence suggests that increased real progressivity of the personal 
tax wedge has stimulated underdeclaration38. 
Relatively strong progressivity of the personal income 
tax and a low· ·degree of cornpensation for double taxation of dividends 
(see Table 17), compounded with the impact of inflation and heavy taxation 
of capital gains, have been blamed for their harmful impact upon 
incentives to save. Despite the empirical difficulties forthe assessment 
of this relationship, there is sorne evidence indicating that direct 
household taxes have exerted a bias against household savings39 
Composition of saving may have been also influenced by tax provisions 
which establish differential treatment across types of assets. Treasury 
bills, public debt, new share issues, insurance contracts, housing 
bank accounts, house acquired with mortgage and investment funds 
have enjoyed over time substantial degrees of fiscal privilege. Finally, 
i t is worth mentioning that the overall impact of social security 
contributions and expected pensions on personal savings has been 
found significant, although the estimated magnitude of this effect 
varies widely40. 
While there is sorne agreement that there has been a positive 
short-run response of pri vate investment to tax incentives 41, doubts 
exist as to whether capital formation decisions have been merely 
brought forward in time. Whatever the real impact of taxes on capital 
accumulation might have been in the past, overall assessment of 
investment tax incentives on efficiency grounds must be undoubtedly 
negative for two reasons. In the first place, the existence of a 
capital shortage in the Spanish economy is not a market failure to 
be solved by means of selective help to investment. On the contrary, 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
TABu: 18: CXllrolAn: TAXATIClI ni 'IlIE E. E. c.: IO!INAL 
AND El! flL'l'I'lE 'I'AX RATES 
(perce¡¡taqe P'ints) 
Jhn'inal1 Effective I!arc!inal Tax Rates' Total fax AlJ.owance3 
Tax Rates l);roipneDt Structures !'!:!U.iment Structures 
43 -S1.5 -9.4 44.8 29.2 
50 -ií.0 -4.8 22.2 12.9 
35 -16.1 -ií.3 32.9 26.2 
42 -25.1 -2o.s 35.4 22.2 
39/49 
Netherland 40 15.2 35.1 41.0 24.0 
Ireland 50 -313.3 -246.2 55.0 55.0 
ltaly 36 -48.2 -SO. 4 24.2 12.9 
~ '}J)/36 
Portuqa.l 30/35 
Germany 36/56 -47.2 -23.1 48.4 27.5 
U. Kingdan 35 -101.2 -ií9.0 52.0 41.4 
Soorces: Frice WaterhcA.lse, ~te Taxes: A IIorldl!ide SIm!naxy, I.aldal 1988; K.J. 
HcI<ee, J. Visser and P. SaUDders, "Marginal Tax Rates al the Use of Lab:lur 
and capital in O!X:D Coontries" , OD:D!hxmj e St1xIies, 7, 1986, pp. 45-101. 
Notes: 1 Greece uses different rates for o:::IIIII!X'cial and industrial fims ldividend 
distr.i.bJtioos are not taxed); lm<snb:Iurg and Portuqa.l apply a l40gIesive 
schedule; Germany taxes dividend distributicns at a loIf rate 136 par cent). 
2 Ratio of the 1fedqe between pre- and post-tax rates of return to the pre-tax 
rate of return al the aarginal investment. Rates are c:anputed for a 1()!1¡ 
pre-tax return investment fjnanced t:Ilrc:ugh DeII equity issues. It taItes into 
/IOO:l\Dlt tax savings ftan depreciatial allOl/allCeS, investment credits, 
special taxatial of capital 9ains mi other features of the tax system. 
3 '!be differeoce between statutory tax rates and capital tax allowances 
indicates the deqree to which the system of capital allOll'allCeS by it self 
is neutral: alla.rances smaller than the tax rate indicate that capital 
formatioo is taxed, and viceversa. 
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i f present capital shortage results from monopoly power in both labor 
and product markets, the appropriate policy should be subsidization 
of both capital and labor paid for with a tax on supernormal profits42 . 
Secondly, had the adoption of more labor-intensive techniques 
counterbalanced past reductions in capital acct.l1lulation, unemployment 
would not have mounted to the 1985 daunting levels. However, increased 
wage pressure in the second hal f of the seventies, rising tax wedges 
on labor income and sharp reductions in marginal tax rates on capital 
have worked precisely in the opposite direction. In such a context, 
investment incentives could prove an obstacle to r~covery of employment 
to the extent that they favor the adoption of more capital-intensive 
techniques, thus hampering welfare gains accruing from wage moderation. 
An entirely di fferent source of non-neutrality is brought 
about by the impact of tax provisions upon the components of capital 
cost. Depreciation allowances, investment credi ts, tax treatment 
of capital gains, taxation of inventories, loss compensation for 
tax purposes and the like distort decisions relevant to the type 
of asset chosen , the sector of investment and the source of finance. 
Available evidence shows that the Spanish corporation income tax 
causes considerable diversity in marginal tax rates on projects yielding 
equal pre-tax returns 43. As Table 18 indicates, statutory tax rates 
bear no direct relationship with marginal effective tax rates. Corporate 
taxation tends to subsidize hypotetical marginal projects, particular ly 
so with regard to investment in equipment. Although not shown in 
the table, i t is worthwhile mentioning that Spain in one of the EEC 
countries where marginal tax rates (subsidies) on investment vary 
more widely across sources of finance44. 
Preceeding considerations are relevant for the Spanish 
economy when considered in isolation from other European countries. 
Increased integrabon of Spain' s goods markets and capital markets 
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-started in 1986 and tCl,J:le completed by 1992- brin9s into the analysis 
further considerations. In the first place, i t has been widely 
acknowledged that substitution of VAT for a previously existing set 
of indirect taxes removed hidden subsidization of exports and tax 
protection of imports. Important as this policy decision has been, 
if Spain is to exploit comparative advantage in the production of 
relatively labor-intensive products as tariff and non-tariff barriers 
are being removed, relative wage and non-wage labor costs have to 
be kept down. This calls for both wage moderation and reluctance 
to overburden labor with excessively large tax wedges. At the present, 
however, social security contribution rates in Spain are among the 
highest in the EEC45 and the employer' s rate -which is the portion 
of the tax wedge most easily shifted on to prices- is the largest. 
Potential distortive effects of this non-wage labor cost disadvantage 
could be cushioned by reductions in employers contributions. An increase 
in VAT rates could make up for the ensuing revenue loss. 
Removal of restrictions to capital movements across EEC 
countries makes inter-country differences in systems of capital income 
taxation a potential source of heavy distortions and tax base flight. 
In a world with perfect capital mobility, 
(equali ty of real after-tax yields from 
abroad) obtains on ly if tax bases share 
capital export neutrality 
investing domestically or 
the same definition, if 
authorities' control of international capital transactions for tax 
purposes is perfect and if double taxation of foreign income is avoided 
through appropriate tax credits in the home country or tax exemptions 
in the host country. Under tax-adjusted covered interest parity, 
deviations from these extreme assumptions will cause changes in 
financial policies and reallocations of capital away from countries 
where capital income is heavily taxed domestically and where control 
of capital income from abroad for tax purposes is lax, thus pushing 
towards convergence of effective marginal tax rates46 . 
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Provided that there is not substantial progress in the 
harmonization of systems of capital income taxation in the short 
run, the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains under the present 
tax provisions and double taxation treaties opens up interesting 
profits opportuni ties from investing abroad, even i f compliance is 
perfect. Once imperfections in tax enforcement are accounted for, 
differences in withholding rates play a crucial role in explaining 
financial arbitrage and cross-country investment decisions. As Table 
19 shows, although withholding rates on interest and dividends paid 
by Spanish enterprises to non-residents are not among the EEC highest, 
they are not the lowest either. 
Adverse consequences of expenditure growth and indebtedness 
To the extent that expansion of public expenditure has 
provided economic and social capital as well as social equity and 
political stability, it must be acknowledged that the growth of 
government has positively influenced the well-being of the population. 
Furthermore, as empirical assessment shows, public expenditures are 
much more effective as redistributional mechanisms than taxes can 
b 47 e . 
It can be argued, however, that this beneficial role 
is not afree good to society. Alleviation of poverty or public provision 
of housing, for example, have two elements of cost. First, resources 
are taken away from alternative private directly-productive uses. 
Second, government involvement tends to jeopardize basic behavioral 
norms, price signals, returns to innovation and investment and, 
hence, economic dynamism. 
General assessment of these costs are di fficult once 
public intervention is dissagregated. Notwi thstanding, pieces of 
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TABIE 19: CCIU'ClOO'E Dm!E TAlMIQI IN 'nIE E.E.C.: 
lIl'I1I!I:l.DIl TAXES a¡ ~ AND D1VIIlIllDS 
(perces¡tage ¡xrlnts) 
!DIE cx:umtY • 
BlST o:nmY 1 _B_ -ªL_ _S_ _F_ 
-ºª-- -1!L ~ ~ _11- .JlL ...Jl!L ~ 
BelQi\lll D 25 15 15 10/15 15 15 15 10/15 5/15 15 15 15 
1 25 0/15 0/15 0/15 O/lO 0/15 0/15 0/15 O/lO 0/15 0/15 0/15 
Demark D 30 30 .10/15 O 30 O 15 5/15 0/15 10/15 10/15 0/15 
1 O O O O O O O O O O O O 
Spain D 15 10/15 25 10/15 20 20 15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 10/15 
1 15 10 25 10 20 20 12 10 10/15 15 10 12 
D 10/15 O 10/15 O 25 10/15 15 5/15 5/10 15 O 5/15 
1 15 O 10 O O O 15 10 O/lO lO/U O O 
D 25 42/53 42/53 42/53 42/53 42/53 25 42/53 35 42/53 25 42/53 
1 15 46 46 10 25/8 46 10 46 10 46 10 O 
D O O O O O O O O O O O 0/15 
1 15 O 35 O 35 0135 10 O O 35 O O 
ltaly D 15 15 15 15 25 15 10 15 0132.4 . 15 32.4 5/15 
1 15 15 12 15 10 10 10/30 10 15/30 15 0/15 15/30 
lI.IxemboJro D 10/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 15 5/15 15 15 25/15 15 10/15 5/15 
1 O O O O O O O O O O O O 
l/etherlands D 5/15 0/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 0/15 O 2.5/15 25 25 10/15 5/15 
1 O O O O O O O O O O O O 
D 12 lO/U lO/U 12 12 12 12 12 12 25 12 lO/U 
1 15 15 15 12 15/25 15/25 15/25 15/25 15/25 20 15 15/25 
D 15/25 15/25 15/25 15/25 25 15/20 25 15/25 15/25 15/25 25 15/25 
1 O O O O 10 O O O O 10 10 O 
U. Kingdan D O 5/15 0/15 0/15 O 0/15 O 5/15 5/15 O O O 
1 15 O 12 O O O 25 O O 10 O 25 
SOUrces: H.V. RaDán and J.A. Rozas, "La tri.I:Iutaciál de las rentas del capital en los estados 1Úembra! de la Ccmmjdad E>.1rcIpea", 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Papeles de Trabajo, 12/89, may, 1989; Price lIaterlx>use, Cotwrate Taxes: A lIorldwille 
~,laldal, 1988, 
Notes: 1. D: dividends; 1: interest. 
2. loIr rates apply to neo residents andIor to payments malle by subsidiarles. 
'. 
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evidence exist that establish a negative relationship between 
productivity or growth potential and the size of public expenditure. 
On the one hand, growth rates in total factor producti vity have been 
usually smaller in social and collective services than in 
of the economy in most developed countries over the 1970-1983 
the rest 
period48 . 
On the other hanú, to the extent that the government' s use of labor 
and capital to produce goods and services and redistribution can 
be proxied b~. government expenditure shares in GDP, a production 
function approach can be used to estimate the 'price' of' public sector 
growth in terms of productivity losses or output foregone. 
Table 20 summarizes the results of an empirical study 
which follows the production function approach. According to these 
calculations, the cost of government expansion has be en about 1.4 
percentage point of GDP growth on average between 1974 and 1987, 
which amounts to a 60 per cent offset of the contribution to output 
growth of total factor productivity. This result is consistent with 
the the available international evidence4g . 
Alternative ways exist to reduce such a large cost. First, 
the most effective means of enhancing competitiveness and rlslng 
potential output is expenditure restructuring towards infrastructure50• 
This needs not imply an increase in total spending if additional 
resources come from reduced expenditure in economic services or frorn 
a more cost-effective oriented management of resources allocated 
to other public projects. Second, government could retrench frorn 
sectors in which social goals can be met by public provision without 
direct public production. A mix of regulation and financial agreements 
with private sector agents is a good substitute for pUblic production 
in sorne social services, like education and health. 
Third, income maintenance expendi tures could undergo 
'producti vi ty' oriented changes. Thus, for example, unemployrnent 
1. 
2. 
3. 
TABIE 20: 00\'mIIfmT SlZE ANO m:tO!IC 
GRCMlI IN SPAIH 
(avexar;¡e real gI'OIItb rates) 
197004 1974-87 
FACIat tmGE 2.5 1.0 
capital 2.3 1.4 
LaIx>r 0.2 -0.4 
R&mUAL FACIat 3.7 0.9 
Total Factor PrOOuctivityl 4.1 2.3 
Gcmmnent Size2 -0.4 -1.4 
(D> G\CMm (1+2) 6.2 1.9 
DifferellCe 
1.5 
-0.9 
-0.6 
-2.8 
-1.8 
-1.0 
-4.3 
SCm'ces: J.L. RayIJI:o:\, "Productividad de las factores yexpansiál del 
sector público en Espafia", Fundaciál FIES-ax::A, Ib::mentos de 
Trabajo, 40, april, 1989. 
lbtes: lWeigbted cx:tIt:rihltioo of capital and latcr productivity 
increases te GIP gI'OIItb. 
2 Government me is praxied by the share of general government 
p¡rchases of gocds and services aM transfers te the pri vate 
sector in GIlP. 
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benefits could bear a closer relationship with employment promotion 
activities (mismatch reduction, recycling and so on) and postponement 
of retirement could be encouraged through higher pension benefits. 
A final suggestion has to do with effectiveness of expenditure 
management and control. This calls for increased efforts in audit 
controls and recommends avoiding preconmitments. Political compromises 
thatenhance fiscal responsibility would work in the same direction. 
Examples of this sort of compromise are the subordination of expenditure 
increases to reductions in tax evasion or the concession of increased 
tax powers to the Territorial governments. 
With regard to debt dynamics, although the debt-GDP ratio 
is smaller in Spain than in the average of the EEC countries, its 
adverse economic consequences should not be played down. As pointed 
out above, the rise in the share of public debt in GDP has been very 
rapid. As a result, interest expenditure expansion has squeezed other 
components of expenditure for a given level of fiscal restraint. 
This makes increasingly hard to achieve further budget restraints, 
as the ongoing boom of economic activity and EMS membership would 
require. 
Budget inflexibili ty resul ting from the increased burden 
of the debt service is compounded by other potential sources of 
preoccupation. A high debt-GDP ratio makes public sector accounts 
highly vulnerable to foreign interest rate shocks as capital mobili ty 
becomes more important. Risks of unstable episodes with brisk debt 
jumps cannot be ignored even if primary superavits obtain on a permanent 
basís and rates of economíc growth are high if non-accomodating monetary 
policies cause interest rates to exceed nominal GDP growth. This 
has been precisely the Spanish situation since the 
Debt explosion has been prevented due to both the 
by compulsory investment by financial institution 
early eighties. 
shield provided 
in low-yield 
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securities51 and the reductions in the primary deficit operated between 
1985 and 1988. As reserve and investment requirements converge toward 
EEC standars, the risks of debt instability will become more apparent. 
A di fferent adverse effect of increasing debt issues has to do with 
of investment rising real interest rates and the ensuing 'crowding out' 
and external demand. Final1y, high and rising debt 
disinflationary policies to the extent that this 
ratios hamper 
9iveS rise to 
expectations Qf future expansions in the money stock. 
C. ADJUSTING TO THE 1992 SHCCK 
Domestic policies: constraints and strategies 
As 1992 comes more close, removal of physical, technical 
and fiscal barriers will enable the EEC to reap the benefits of the 
Single Market. Increased competition will generate benefits and costs 
whose distribution across countries will depend on both comparati ve 
advantage and adjustment policies adopted in the domestic and the 
Community levels. 
Appropriate domestic policies should be designed so as 
to maximize gains from enhanced competition in goods and factor markets 
in an 
-wide 
environment constrained by domestic objectives 
restrictions. Outstanding among the later are 
and Community-
the abolition 
of barriers to goods transactions and capital movements, recent EMS 
membership and differences in taxation of goods and capital incomes. 
The most prominent domestic objectives are those related with the 
need to maintain and finance relatively large rates of growth in 
investment -as a means of increasing competitiveness and reducing 
unemployrnent associated to the shortage of capital- and the challenge 
to improve social services and infrastructure. 
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Under EMS, expansionary fiscal policy will prove costly, 
now and as 1992 approaches. Provided that anticipation of EMS membership 
to June 1989 largely responds to the convenience of borrowing reputation 
from linking the Spanish Pta to the German CM in order to facilitate 
disinflation, maintaining an expansionary fiscal stance could hamper 
pursuance of this objective. This would be the case if appreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate52 gives rise to expectations of downward 
realignments of the Pta. 
There are further arguments that would recommend the 
adoption of a more restrictive fiscal policy. -To the extent that 
budget-induced expansions generate increases in home prices 
to those of foreigners, expansionary fiscal policy 
competitiveness. Investment crowding-out may also obtain, 
in a lesser degree than in the presence of restrictions to 
relative 
damages 
although 
capital 
mobili ty. Expectations of future tax increases to eliminate present 
defici ts could induce capital flights, thus making móre di fficult 
to finance fiscal imbalances by means of domestic resources. In such 
a context, the external sector restriction could seriously impair 
investment and growth. As Table 21 shows, resort to foreign savings 
has increased by 2.8 percentage points of GOP between 1986 and 1988. 
Continuation of this process seems unlikely, as recent capital balance 
forecasts point out 53. 
Changes in tax revenues and tax policy are necessary 
in order to eliminate further constraints in the operation of fiscal 
policy. With national monetary policy essentially tied to maintaining 
exchange rate stability, the Spanish fiscal authorities will not 
have access to defici t financing by the central bank. As Table 22 
indicates, between 1979 and 1986 resources obtained through seignorage 
amounted to 1.8 per cent of GOP on average. A reduction of this tax 
on money balances to the average share of seignorage in GOP of EMS 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
TABlE 21: SAVlm ANO ~ 
lWm:!:S CE 'mE SPANISII m:tnIY 
(par cent of GIP) 
1980-84 1985 
'I'Ol'AL IXIIE.m:C SAVlm 19.4 2JJ.4 
Pri vate saving 19.6 21.9 
Booseholli 8.6 8.5 
Business U.O 13.4 
Public saving -0.1 -1.4 
G\OOS lNVES'l1!!N1' 21.0 18.8 
aJRmfl' mmm. BAWa 
(oofc:ceign savjng with -1.5 1.6 
opp:site sigo) 
1986 1987 
21.5 21.8 
21.9 20.4 
8.1 7.9 
13.8 12.5 
-0.5 1.4 
19.8 21.8 
1.7 0.0 
Soorce: <E:D, CiXll F.calC:mic SUrveys: Spain, París, may, 1987. 
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1988 
22.7 
20.9 
8.2 
12.7 
1.8 
23.8 
-1.1 
TABLE 22: SEI<KIWlE ANO 'l'1IX REVmlES 1 
lper cent of <D'; in brackets, per cent of total tax revenues) 
m:: (12) 
1.0 
12.4) 
m:: (10) 
0.9 
12.0) 
197H986 
1.8 
15.9) 
m:: 197~ 1986 a 
0.9 
12.1) 
SPAIN 197H988 
M::Il 00 Co.mtries 
1.3 
13.6) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
1.9 1. 7 2.0 0.6 
15.5) 14.8) 15.4) 11.8) 
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Soorces: oo::D, Fmmies in Transiticn: Structural Adjustment Experience in oo::D CcmItries, 
París, july, 1988, mimeo; Banco de Fspaña, Informe Anual and Boletin Estadístico, 
1985-1988; 0IIlI calculaticns. 
J'i)tes: 1 0laDge in tbe l!JXIetary base as a percentage of <D'. 
2 lleigbted averaqes 11985 GDP weights and exchanqe rates) 
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countries will entail a revenue loss close to 1 per cent of GDP. 
Other taxes must be changed so as to make up for this 
loss while providing resources for additional expenditure needs. 
In the present stage of the tax harmonization process, the constraints 
posed by the exigency to counterbalance the insufficient level of 
domes tic saving without impinging upon employrnent suggests three 
main sources of additional tax revenues: increases in VAT and excise 
tax rates, improvements in compliance levels and reductions in tax 
expenditures. 
Prevention of tax base flights recommends unilateral changes 
in the taxation of capital income in those aspects where Spain is 
at a relative disadvantage {taxation of capital gains in personal 
and corporate taxes, double taxation of dividend income, tax treatment 
of inventories and loss compensation, among other aspects}. Employrnent 
growth and comparative advantage exploitation suggest the convenience 
of restructuring social security contributions through reductions 
in the employer' s contribution rate and the progressive elimination 
of contribution base ceilings. 
On the expenditure side, positive adjustment to the 1992 
shock demands both a reinforcement of specific expenditure priorities 
and improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. As regards to 
priori ties, the extent to which the benefíts of the Internal Market 
will be reaped hinges upon the degree of success in the suppression 
of actual and potential bottlenecks created by infrastructure 
defficiencies, even at the cost of reductions in other expendi ture 
programmes. And above all, this priority should not be at risk whenever 
other expendi ture needs put a pressure upon the polítical authority. 
Given that expenditures in pensions, education and health care are 
expected to rise faster than GDP over the 1989-1992 period due to 
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precommitments under ongoing programmes, additional resources for 
infrastructure improvement should come from other expenditure i tems 
-in particular interest, price subsidies and capital transfers-, 
from further sales of public assets and from increased taxation. Outlook 
for doubling of capital transfers from the EEC to two-thirds of GDP 
in 1992 will have beneficial effects as to the infrastructure priority. 
of 
Room for improvement in 
government expendi ture policies 
efficiency 
is 
and effectiveness 
enhancement could come from a variety 
subs tantial • 
of sources: 
Effectiveness 
elimination of 
the possibility of obtaining large amounts of cash finance from the 
central bank (see Table 23), introduction of cost-benefit and 
cost-effecti veness cri teria in project selection and management, 
change in institutional features that favor laxity in the execution 
of the budget (concession of supplementary credits and employment 
of unused appropriations) and avoidance of precomnitments where 
possible. On the other hand, efficiency gains may be obtained in 
the medium term from retrenchment from sectors in which social goals 
can be met by regulation without pUblic production (health and 
education), reductions in price subsidies and capital transfers and 
introduction of productivity criteria in income maintenance expenditures 
(pensions and unemployment subsidies). 
Strategy towards Comnunity policies 
Spain should promote policy coordination among EEC member 
countries. Given the distances that exist in living standards, social 
policy achievements and infrastructures, the alternati ve of favoring 
a purely competitive strategy is not a reasonable option for Spain. 
On the other hand, a strategy of 'follower country' -ignorance of 
Communi ty processes and acceptance 
negotiation of compensations- would 
of Comnunity decisions upon 
not yield long-term pay-offs, 
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Limits en 
lbl-Interest Interest Bearinq Ti tles Regulaticn of 
Borrowing H:n-Harket Harket lmilarket I.eOOing 
{,\Ianti tati ve (l.ow) ft¡t permitted ~market Par liamentary 
~tials auy CiWIoval 
Belgium {,\Iantitative (high) Incllried in tbe Central Ba!lk-Treasury 
former limi t No limit agreements 
Denmark PtOjXJl tien of total Incllried in tbe Central Bank-Treasury 
CiWIopriatials (high) former limi t No limit agreements 
Spain Pw¡mticn of total Par liamentary 
app¡:optiatials (high) ft¡ limit ft¡ limit appIoual. 
FraIlee {,\Iantitative (l.ow) ft¡t permitted ft¡ limit Parliamentary 
apptoval 
NetherlaIxls {,\Iantitative (l.ow) Special limit ft¡ limit Central Ba!lk-Treasury 
agreenent 
ltaly PtOjXJlticn of total Parliamentary 
CiWIOptiatials (high) ti permi tted No limit approval 
U. Kingdan ft¡t permitted ft¡t permitted ft¡ limit 
Sources: E. FernáIxlez mi F. Gutiérrez, ''La financiacioo del Tesoro p:lr las baIlOlS centrales en las 
bancos centrales en los principales paises de la CEE", Bolet:!n F<mIrrri al, Banco de España, 
september, 1987. 
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given Spain's level of development and growth potentialo 
It is only through policy coordination that an equi table 
sharing of benefi ts and costs of the Internal Market can be expected 
in the Comnunityo This is not to say that coordination is a 'sine 
qua non' condi tion for a particular country to gain from 19920 However, 
the role of coordination is not just instrumental but poli tical as 
well. It is instrumental to the extent that coordination provides 
cushions against shocks in the process ending at the Internal Market o 
It is poli tical in the sen se of ensuring equi ty and social cohesion 
in a context of countries whích do not conform a póli tical union o 
Loss of discretionary powers to pursue domestic objectives 
through public expendi tures and fiscal policy should call for a greater 
role given to the EEC Budget as a means of allocating resources and 
redistributing incomes between EEC citizens and EEC regionso As the 
costs of removal of barriers are expected to spread Llnevenly across 
regions and countries, so should an increased amount of EEC funds 
be allocated to compensate .those effects in such a fashion that 
incentives to withdraw from the integration process are eliminatedo 
A more equi table distribution of countries' shares in the financing 
of the EEC Budget would work in the same directiono 
Stabilization of income and employment is not presently 
a function of the EEC Budget, although some stabilization role would 
be defensibleo As EMS membership entails doing away with a cushioning 
mechanism against recession (i o e o depreciation of the exchange rate), 
the limited room that 1992 will leave for autonomous discretionary 
domestic fiscal policies would recommend the creation of EEC 
stabilization subsidies and transfers, in order to make the Monetary 
Un ion a more viable projecto 
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Wi th regard to the revenue side. Spain should promote 
tax harmonization along the lines devised in the recent Commission 
proposals. Al though tax harmonization is not always seen as necessary 
in the context of political federations, the absence of substantial 
harmonization of product and factor taxes could impinge upon the 
objectives of the Internal Market. Proposals that defend alternative 
arrangements, such as mutual assistance and the like, ignore the 
foremost instrumental and poli tical importance of tax harmonization 
for economic and social cohesion. 
Therefore, as much as possible, di fferences in tax bases 
and rates of VAT and excises should narrow across countries if the 
adoption of an origin principIe of taxation simultaneous with the 
elimitation of physical barriers is to succeed in avoiding trade 
distortions along wi th fiscal fraud. As much as possible, tax bases 
and withholding rates of corporate income taxation should be harmonized 
if the conrnitments to exchange--rate fixity and unrestricted capital 
mobility are not to be challegec tax competition, international 
tax evasion and perceptions of an unfair distribution of the gains 
from increased competition. 
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